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Democratic governance rests on a precarious relationship 
between the civilian and military branches of 
government. This relationship is threatened whenever 
civil-military relations become polarised. This theme is 
explored through a case study of the French Army during 
the Algerian War, in which tensions with the de Gaulle 
government grew as the Army politicised. This 
culminated in an attempted coup d’état in 1961 and the 
rise of the terrorist OAS group. The thesis conducts its 
analysis through the prism of the guerre révolutionnaire 
doctrine, which it considers an essential, yet too often 
overlooked, catalysing factor in the Army’s 
politicisation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The years after World War II saw a rapid rise of 
independence movements, of which those in the French 
Empire were among the most prominent. France, which 
had been devastated by the early-war defeat by Germany, 
and subsequently divided over its collaborationist Vichy 
Government, first sent its Army to Indochina to stop Ho 
Chi Minh’s nationalist movement, which resulted in an 
eight-year war and ended with the traumatic loss at the 
Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954. Inspired by the 
Viet-Minh’s victory, insurrections reinvigorated in 
Algeria. Believing that the Army and France itself could 
not survive another military defeat, especially not if this 
would lead to the loss of not just some faraway 
protectorate, but an integral part of France, the military 
saw it as its duty to defend “l’Algérie française” at any 
cost.1 
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However, the French had learnt from their defeat in 
Indochina. The war had shown the importance of civilian 
support, the strength of unified politico-military command, 
and the utility of psychological measures.2  
In an effort to codify “a new set of operational and strategic 
‘fixed values’” in a post-war (and post-holocaust) era 
where norms seemed to be “rare”, the doctrine of la guerre 
révolutionnaire was developed. It held that “the conflicts 
in Indochina and Algeria [were] part of a global 
Communist strategy to win the Cold War without using 
vast conventional forces. This would be a new type of war 
in which accepted norms of conventional military strategy, 
organisation, and tactics were obsolete.”3 Therefore, the 
French military was to “reorganise and redoctrinize” to 
fight it and conquer the “hearts and minds” of the local 
population.4 
Although controversial throughout the war, the 
doctrine seems to have been highly influential. According 
to several historians, “there is little doubt that the 
development of the theory of guerre révolutionnaire and 
the debates that accompanied it had a considerable 
influence on many within the French Army” and several 
“key figures” within the civil administration.5 One 
straightforward reason for this is that many adherents of 
the doctrine, in their “greater crusade for the spiritual and 
national future of France”, played a significant role in at 
least three large threats to French domestic stability and 
democracy that occurred during the war.6 The first was the 
May 1958 military coup d’état that led to the fall of the 
Fourth Republic and the appointment of Charles de Gaulle. 
The second was the failed coup of 1961, which took place 
after de Gaulle had expressed his willingness to grant the 
Algerians self-determination. It occurred in Algiers from 
21 to 26 April, and a total of 14,000 officers was 
implicated.7 The third was the Organisation Armée Secrète 
(OAS), a terrorist organisation that would arise after the 
failed coup and shock French society by conducting a great 
number of operations in both Algeria and the metropole, 
including assassinations and bomb attacks, which resulted 
in more than a thousand deaths.8 
This episode of human tragedy raises many 
questions, but this thesis focuses on the relationship 





military’s resistance to the French Government. The 
research question is: How did the French guerre 
révolutionnaire doctrine influence the military coup 
d’état attempt against Charles de Gaulle in 1961, and the 
subsequent rise of the OAS? 
Throughout the thesis, it is argued that the 
doctrine helped politicise the French military and 
challenge the Government. Not only did the doctrine 
provide a clear justification for the attempted coup of 
1961, and for subsequent terrorism under the OAS, it also 
had a significant influence in the operationalisation of 
these revolutionary efforts.9  
To make this argument, the thesis is primarily focussed 
on the new, total, form of warfare that the doctrine 
identified and the implications this would have for civil-
military relations. Moreover, some of the psychological 
effects that the doctrine as a set of ideas may have had are 
considered. 
RESEARCH 
The research for this thesis has followed a process tracing 
approach, which is understood to concern the following: 
[T]he systematic examination of diagnostic 
evidence selected and analysed in light of 
research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigator. […] Process tracing […] is an 
analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal 
inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – 
often understood as part of a temporal sequence 
of events or phenomena.10 
The evidence collected to address this thesis’ research 
question came from three main efforts:  
• A literature review of the existing (Anglophone 
and Francophone) literature on the Algerian war 
and the role the doctrine played herein; 
• The reading of the biographies of two key actors 
in the counter-governmental efforts of the 
Army, Generals Raoul Salan and Maurice 
Challe.11 Both were dismissed as Commander-
in-Chief of the French Army by de Gaulle and 
retired shortly thereafter. Salan and Challe were 
the leading figures of the 1961 putsch, and the 
former would later become the head of the OAS;  
• Archival research in the French Military 
Archives in Chateau de Vincennes. During a 
week of research, more than one thousand files 
were examined. 
Altogether, this research considers and links factors and 
facets across different levels of analysis: from the micro 
level (individual personalities and career trajectories) to 
the meso level (French society and culture and its 
complicated links to Algeria) and the macro level (the 
intersections between decolonisation and the Cold War). 
After an introduction, literature review and 
methodology section, the thesis addresses its research 
question through three analytical chapters: the first 
focussing on the guerre révolutionnaire doctrine, 
addressing its origins, the imminent threat it identified, and 
the implications this was to have for civil-military 
relations; the second analysing the integration of the 
doctrine in the French armed forces and tracing the role the 
doctrine played in the 1961 coup attempt; and the third, 
addressing the rise of the OAS and the doctrinal elements 
that are identifiable in its plan of action, as well as its 
organizational structure. 
RESULTS 
Following its research and analysis, this thesis concludes 
that the guerre révolutionnaire doctrine played an 
important role in the process of politicisation of the French 
Army by unifying officers and civilians of different 
backgrounds and personalities in an alliance against de 
Gaulle, and by justifying the contra-governmental efforts 
that would develop into terrorism under the OAS.  
The doctrine did so by its identification of an imminent and 
total communist threat, which it combined with an inherent 
contempt for democratic institutions. It was believed that 
the open character of democracies made it easy to be 
penetrated by communist influences, which meant it had to 
be militarised. Moreover, liberal democracies were 
supposed to lack the coercive powers to influence the 
people’s minds effectively – an issue that could be 
overcome through an integrated politico-military structure. 
This meant that the Army was to take an active ideological 
and political role in defending its country against 
(psychological) attacks.12 
Furthermore, the archival research has 
substantiated the claim that the connection between the 
doctrine and the 1961 putsch is not one that could be 
retrospectively read into the events: several records were 
found to indicate that many segments of the Government 
explicitly linked the rebellious efforts to the doctrine at the 
time.13 The same goes for the relationship with the OAS, 
whose plan of psychological action was found to be “toute 
de logique ‘Guerre révolutionnaire’”.14 
 While making this argument, the thesis finds that 
the doctrine is too often overlooked in interpretations of 
these efforts against President de Gaulle. For instance, 
Alistair Horne does not discuss the role of the doctrine in 
his prominent work A Savage War of Peace, nor does 
Alexander Harrison make an explicit link with the doctrine 
in his important work on the OAS.15 
DISCUSSION  
In his 1965 work Lost Soldiers, Kelly already wrote that 
“[t]he doctrine of la guerre révolutionnaire was a result 
both of the analysis of combat experience and of 
institutional self-justification. And being a ‘global theory’ 
that excluded nothing, it could not help but lead the Army 
in a political direction.”16 A year earlier, Paret had 





political explosiveness” and concluded that the doctrine 
was a significant driving force behind the Army’s 
politicisation, and resentment of de Gaulle.17 
However, while both works have remained highly 
influential in the literature on the Algerian war and the 
doctrine, their age makes that they were inherently 
limited by the restrictions imposed by French State (on 
e.g. archival materials and the possibility of interviewing 
those involved), as well as time (the short time after 
events gave less space for reflection). Benefitting from 
the large number of publications and declassified archival 
documents that appeared in the last fifty-three years, this 
research project confirms the conclusions of Paret and 
Kelly. By the same token, this project adds to the more 
recent literature, as several of the archival documents 
have never been presented in academia before. 
At the same time, admitting that the coup and rise 
of the OAS are likely to have been the product of a 
number of factors, and that the relationship between ideas 
and action is hard to consolidate, this thesis does not aim 
to ‘prove’ the causal role of the guerre révolutionnaire 
doctrine.18 
Instead, it is argued that the doctrine is too often 
overlooked in interpretations of these efforts against 
President de Gaulle, and new evidence is presented that 
strongly suggests that the doctrine has been a core 
catalysing factor. In line with Pahlavi, who posited that 
the May 1958 crisis that led to the return of de Gaulle 
should be approached from the perspective of la guerre 
révolutionnaire, this thesis argues that the doctrine holds 
great significance in attempts to understand the 1961 
coup and the rise of the OAS.19 
RELEVANCE 
This research is relevant for several reasons. First of all, 
it holds academic significance for two strands of research 
on the study of the Algerian war, which endured from 
1954 to 1962 and took about 25,000 French and 300,000 
Muslim lives, and led to severe French domestic 
instability.20 
The first is the strategic studies-related field of the guerre 
révolutionnaire doctrine, which has received inadequate 
scholarly attention, resulting in calls for more research 
that are as recent as 2017; the second is the terrorism 
studies-related analysis of the OAS and the coup attempt 
that preceded it, which seems to have incorporated the 
doctrine’s influence only to a limited extent in recent 
years.21  
What is more, some of the claims made about the doctrine 
appear to be based on little evidence or lack analytical 
nuance. Illustrative of the latter is Porch’s chapter on the 
doctrine, in which he refers to its adherents as “the French 
army’s counterinsurgency mafia”.22 
Moreover, this project holds significance for wider 
society. The memory of the Algerian war has 
“profoundly divided and agitated” the French people, and, 
as was shown by the debate following President Macron’s 
recent acknowledgement of “systematic” French use of 
torture during the war, continues to do so.23 Furthermore, 
the guerre révolutionnaire doctrine is not just an obscure 
ideology driven by Cold War fears: its concepts have 
widely influenced counterinsurgency theory and 
practice.24 
Although Algeria’s prominent position within the 
French colonial empire, and the French precedent of de 
Gaulle opposing the Vichy Government may make the 
particular case studied in this thesis a unique one, the 
dynamics and patterns traced here are also relevant to other 
Western states during the Cold War. As the New York 
Times wrote in 1947, “How can we prepare for total war 
without becoming a ‘garrison state’ and destroying the 
very qualities and virtues and principles we originally set 
about to save? This […] is the grand dilemma […] of our 
age”.25 
Considering the relevance of this thesis to 
contemporary world politics, one can find several 
resonances.  Although the end of both Cold War and 
decolonisation significantly limits the doctrine’s 
applicability to the past few decades, the current ‘war on 
terror’, and the following  debate on the trade-off between 
civil rights and extensive security provision, shows how 
“the grand dilemma” of 1947 can easily be argued to have 
persisted up to today. Likewise, the recently attempted 
coups in Turkey and Venezuela demonstrate that civil-
military relations can still grow tense in the face of great 
security threats.26 
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